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REGULATING THE GLOBAL BANKING
NETWORK-WHAT ROLE (IF ANY) FOR
THE IMF?*
STEPHEN ZAMORA**
N S one who has grown up with the IMF' and who has spent many
rustrating hours trying to understand it, I welcome the opportunity
to address a learned and interested audience about an organization that
has had such an important impact on the development of international
economic law.2 Rather than eulogize the Fund for its accomplishments,
however, I prefer to celebrate the institution by focusing critically on its
ability, at age fifty, to fulfill the goals for which it was established. I have
selected two of these goals-exchange rate stability and the promotion of
a liberal payments regime-and will address the IMFs abilities to
achieve them under current conditions of global banking and relative
freedom of capital movements.
The specific subject that I have chosen is the IMF's role in regulating
the global banking network, that increasingly pervasive web of private
international banks and investment firms that links national economies
throughout the world. This subject should give you pause-since when
does the IMF have a role in regulating international banking? The IMF
deals with central banks, not private banks. Its relationship to the latter
is so indirect as to be virtually non-existent.
My central thesis is that the IMF can no longer afford the luxury of
ignoring the operations of the international financial industry to the ex-
tent that it has in the past. International banking and capital markets
have grown significantly since the IMF was founded. Over the past
twenty years, international banking activity has expanded at an annual
rate that is approximately twice the rate of growth in world trade and
world output.3 As we shall see, the IMF recognizes the importance of
international banking activities and the increases in capital movements
* Address given by Professor Stephen T. Zamora on March 10, 1994 as part of
Fordham University School of Law Graduate Colloquium 1993-1994.
** Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. I wish to thank Michael
Curtis (LL.M. Houston, 1994) and Karen Fujii (J.D. Yale, 1994) for research assistance
in connection with this article.
1. The IMF and I were born the same year-1944---if one dates the IMPs birth by
the date on which the IMF Articles of Agreement were signed (July 22, 1944), rather
than the Agreement's entry into force (December 27, 1945). While this coincidence
seems to have escaped the media, I have taken due note of it, and plan to celebrate (with
the decorum fitting of an IMF-watcher) the achievements, if not the realization of all the
dreams, of our first fifty years.
2. For a discussion of the contributions of the IMF and of its former General Coun-
sel to the development of international monetary law, see the symposium honoring Sir
Joseph Gold in 23 Int'l Law. 799-1041 (1989), reprinted in Festschrift in Honor of Sir
Joseph Gold (Werner F. Ebke & Joseph J. Norton, eds., 1990).
3. See Mary E. Footer, GA TT and the Multilateral Regulation of Banking Services,
1953
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that such activities occasion. Capital flows occasioned by international
banking activities profoundly affect the ability of the Fund to achieve its
goals. Nevertheless, the IMF has not seen fit to define its scope of activi-
ties to encompass more direct involvement, along with member govern-
ments, in the regulation of international banking.
As IMF studies themselves indicate, the operations of international
banks and currency traders have an immense influence on the achieve-
ment of the goals of exchange rate stability, the integrity of the interna-
tional payments system, and the duration and extent of balance of
payments crises. It takes little effort, therefore, to read into the IMF
Agreement a scope of authority that encompasses concern for the regula-
tion of international banking operations to enhance exchange rate stabil-
ity or to promote a secure and rational international payments network.4
Given the propensity of international organizations to expand their juris-
diction-the Uruguay Round of the GATT is the most recent example of
this--enlarging the Fund's scope of activities to encompass a more direct
concern for the regulation of private banking activity would not be un-
heard of. The IMF's sister organization, The World Bank Group, now
includes affiliated organizations-the International Finance Corporation,
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("IC-
SID"), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA")-
that deal directly with the activities of private enterprises.5 The IMF
could take a much more active role in regulating international banking
27 Int'l Law. 343, 344 (1993) (citing Trade and Development Report 1990 (UNCTAD
Secretariat, New York, 1990, at 110, tbl. 28)).
4. The stated purposes of the IMF, which are drafted broadly, are listed in Article I
of the IMF Agreement as follows:
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent
institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on
international monetary problems.
(ii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrange-
ments among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in
respect of current transactions between members and in the elimination of for-
eign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade.
(v) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the
degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members.
The Fund shall be guided in all its policies and decisions by the purposes set forth in
this Article.
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, December 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, as amended, 20 U.S.T. 2775, 726 U.N.T.S. 266
(May 31, 1968); 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937 (April 30, 1976). The Third Amend-
ment of the IMF Agreement, which entered into force November 11, 1992, is reprinted at
31 I.L.M. 1307, 1309-10 (1992).
5. The International Finance Corporation takes equity interests alongside private
investors in investments in developing countries. ICSID establishes a dispute settlement
regime for disputes between private investors and host governments. MIGA guarantees
private investments in member countries.
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and international capital markets, by (1) providing a forum in which gov-
ernments could meet to consider such regulation; or, more significantly,
(2) pressing IMF member governments to adopt national or international
mechanisms of regulation and control. The question remains whether it
should do so.
The IMF is a cautious organization, reflecting the caution that charac-
terizes central banking generally. It is a reactive, rather than a proactive
agency; it responds to outside pressures for policy change more often
than it proposes dramatic changes. I am not aware that the IMF itself
has begun to consider its role in this regard, or that any government or
group has done so. Indeed, calling upon the IMF to become more di-
rectly concerned with regulating the global banking network assures one
of immediate opposition. First, the tide of financial deregulation and lib-
eralization of capital movements has not subsided, and any mention of
increased banking regulation is contrary to the trend. Second, to the ex-
tent that international coordination of banking regulation is considered
an acceptable goal, other organizations-the Bank for International Set-
tlements (through the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision), the
GATT, or the OECD-monopolize the attention of commentators.6
Other organizations may be better suited to deal with issues of interna-
tional banking regulation in general. This is not to say, however, that the
Fund must ignore the subject if the regulation of international banking
impinges upon the IMF's ability to achieve the goals that are set out in
its charter. In particular, the Fund should be sufficiently concerned
about international banking operations, international payments and for-
eign currency markets to consider taking a more active role in pressing
governments to undertake beneficial regulations, either individually or in
concert. My purpose here is to suggest such a role, and some ways in
which this might be done.
I will attempt to make a case for increased IMF involvement in regu-
lating international banking and capital markets by first examining the
principal international concerns of bank regulators at the present time. I
will then relate these concerns to problems facing the international mon-
etary system.
I. CONCERNS OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION
During the 1980's, the threat of widespread defaults on developing
country debt monopolized the concern of bank regulators and treasury
6. "[IThe establishment of an appropriate international regulatory framework for
trade in banking services is an ongoing, long-term effort.... Our analysis suggests that
consideration should be given to continuing this work in the OECD or the GATT, either
of which could serve as the forum for agreement on the appropriate principles and could
participate in or coordinate the efforts of other specialized fora in arriving at harmonized
rules where they are deemed necessary." Sydney J. Key & Hal S. Scott, International
Trade in Banking Services: A Conceptual Framework 43 (Group of Thirty, Occasional
Paper No. 35, 1991).
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officials in many nations. This danger has subsided, but only after pain-
ful adjustments to many developing country economies that suffered
through years of what economists euphemistically call "negative
growth." The attention of banking, treasury and monetary officials has
now shifted to new areas of concern. Like the developing country debt
crisis, these new areas of concern arise out of a surge in activity in inter-
national financial markets due to developments that are not well under-
stood and to which bank regulators are slow to respond.7
A. Foreign Exchange Markets and Trading in Derivatives
Due to the removal of many countries' restrictions on capital move-
ments, and to dramatic technological advances in trading systems, for-
eign currency trading has become the hot international banking market
of the 1990's. The world's foreign exchange markets have grown so large
that they gulf individual national economies and central bank reserves.
According to the IMF, worldwide foreign exchange trading (net turno-
ver) exceeds 1 trillion dollars per day.' Both banks and non-banks (i.e.,
multinational corporations, trading companies and investment firms) are
important players in foreign exchange markets, attracted by the impres-
sive profits to be earned in short periods of time.
The greatest increase in foreign exchange trading activity has occurred
in the so-called financial derivatives market-a global market that has
grown into a multi-billion dollar activity. Derivatives are financial in-
struments that derive their value from underlying economic indicators,
including currencies. There is a wide variety of such instruments avail-
able for purchase either in over-the-counter markets or on financial ex-
changes: forward currency contracts, currency swaps, currency options,
interest rate swaps, and futures contracts (interest and currencies) to
name the most important.9 According to IMF figures, in 1991 the global
derivatives market (outstanding exchange-traded and OTC contracts) to-
talled eight trillion dollars (notional value), or 140% of United States
7. In the case of the developing country debt crisis, the rapid growth of Eurodollar
deposits led to a scale of sovereign lending that had not been seen previously. Only after
many of the loans proved uncollectible did banking authorities begin to impose pruden-
tial regulations. See, e.g., International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-
181, §§ 901-13, 97 Stat. 1153, 1278-84 (1983) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-
12 (1992)). A similar pattern of market developments followed by financial crises can be
found throughout the 1970's and 1980's. See International Monetary Fund, Determi-
nants and Systemic Consequences of International Capital Flows 31-35 (Occasional Pa-
per No. 77, 1991) [hereinafter Determinants and Systemic Consequences] (discussing
measures to contain systemic risks in international financial markets).
8. See International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Part I: Ex-
change Rate Management and International Capital Flows 24 (Morris Goldstein et al.,
eds., 1993) [hereinafter International Capital Markets. Part I].
9. See generally The Growing Involvement of Banks in Derivative Finance-A Chal-
lenge for Financial Policy, in International Monetary Fund, International Capital Mar-
kets: Part II: Systemic Issues in International Finance 23-32 (1993) [hereinafter
International Capital Markets. Part II].
1956 [Vol. 62
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GDP.1" In 1992, the aggregate credit exposure of ten United States
banks due to derivatives trading was $170 billion, or 17.3% of their total
assets. The bulk of this exposure (69%) was associated with exchange
rate contracts.II
One reason for the marked growth of derivatives trading is the rela-
tively unregulated nature of the foreign exchange market. In an industry
that is highly regulated, foreign exchange trading of major currencies,
even when conducted by banks, remains a relatively unregulated activity.
This is especially true in the United States, where foreign currency expo-
sure of banks is not subject to any specific regulatory limitations
(although currency positions are monitored). 2
The growth of the derivatives activities of banks has begun to concern
bank regulators. The concerns have focused both on individual bank
creditworthiness, as well as on systemic risks involved with an activity
that is still poorly understood by bankers and bank regulators alike.' 3
According to a recent IMF report,
[c]onsidering the phenomenal growth of the OTC derivative markets,
the potential for systemic risk, and the fact that this relatively compli-
cated subject is admittedly not fully understood by either senior bank
managers or by senior regulators, it is not surprising that questions
have been raised about the adequacy of the existing regulatory
framework.
14
A significant side effect of the growth of foreign exchange and deriva-
tives trading has been a rapid growth in gross international capital flows,
particularly between industrialized nations. t5 These flows reflect the
10. See id. at 23.
11. See id. at 27.
12. See International Capital Markets. Part I, supra note 8, at 6-7 (comparing regula-
tory constraints on foreign currency-denominated investments by major financial institu-
tions in selected industrialized countries).
13. See id. at 28-32. See also Derivatives: Practices and Principles 2 (Global Deriva-
tives Study Group, 1993) (a series of studies by the Group of Thirty "explaining deriva-
tives and their uses" and "formulating and disseminating recommendations about their
management"); Derivatives: Practices and Principles, Appendix 1: Working Papers
(Global Derivatives Study Group, 1993) (presenting the working papers of various sub-
committees of the study group); Derivatives: Practices and Principles, Appendix 11:
Legal Enforceability: Survey of Nine Jurisdictions (Global Derivatives Study Group,
1993) (compiling legal memoranda discussing issues of enforceability in Australia, Can-
ada, England, France, Germany, Japan, Singapore and the United States); Global Deriv-
atives: Public Sector Responses (James A. Leach, et al., Occasional Paper No. 44, 1993)
(speeches by three regulators and one legislator, commenting on the Group of Thirty's
1993 study on global derivatives).
14. International Capital Markets. Part II, supra note 9, at 31.
Congressional hearings in the Spring of 1994, and a recent report by the General Ac-
counting Office, have focused attention on the possible need for greater regulation of
derivatives markets. See Report on Derivatives Said to Seek New S.KC Power, N.Y.
Times, May 5, 1994, D1, col. 1.
15. See id. at 30; see also Determinants and Systemic Consequences, supra note 7, at
5-7, tbl. 2-3 (figures on net and gross capital flows during the 1970's and 1980's among
major industrial countries).
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short-term capital movements that characterize these markets. Because
of such flows, capital markets in these countries are more closely linked
than ever before. As we shall see, one result of such linkage is the poten-
tial for rapid and profound fluctuations in exchange rates.
B. Systemic Risks in the International Payments System
The growth in foreign exchange trading presupposes an international
payments and clearing mechanism that can handle increases in the vol-
ume of transactions within these markets. Thanks to technological ad-
vances, the international payments system has been able to keep up with
the demand for higher volumes of transactions without sacrificing the
security of individual payments transactions. Nevertheless, banks and
bank regulators have focused considerable attention on systemic risks in
the international payments system-for instance, the risk that the insol-
vency of a large bank, unable to fulfill its payments obligations in accord-
ance with international payments rules, may cause a domino effect that
unsettles the payments system. This concern has preoccupied banking
officials in all the industrialized countries, and has led to efforts by UN-
CITRAL to harmonize the rules concerning potential liabilities within
international payments systems. 6 While the IMF's purposes include
assistance in the establishment of a multilateral payments system, it has
remained outside this discussion.
C. Capital Adequacy
The external debt crises of the 1980's, coupled with continued liberali-
zation and deregulation of financial markets, produced another concern
among bank regulators-that the capital requirements of major banks
did not reflect the true risks facing the banks in a deregulated and inter-
nationally competitive market. As a result, the Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision 7 adopted a set of guidelines on capital adequacy of
banks to which twenty countries now adhere.' These guidelines, known
as the Basle Accord on Capital Adequacy, were adopted with two major
goals in mind: first, to require banks to maintain higher levels of capital
reserves through maintenance of capital-to-asset ratios that are "risk-
16. See generally Amelia H. Boss, The Emerging Law of International Electronic
Commerce, 6 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 293, 301, 304-07 (1992) (discussing the evolution
of international electronic commerce and arguing that countries work together to develop
a common understanding on which a universal international legal framework may be
built).
17. The Basle Committee is an informal body of bank regulators from the Group of
ten countries that meets under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements
("BIS") in Basle, Switzerland, to discuss common issues of concern. The full name of the
Committee is the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices.
18. The guidelines are reprinted in Bank for International Settlements: Committee
on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards, 30 I.L.M. 980-1008 (1991) (with introductory note
by Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, 30 I.L.M. 967 (1991)).
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based" (i.e., that reflect the real credit risks as well as risks of banks'
(increasingly important) off-balance-sheet positions); and second, to es-
tablish a level playing field so that a bank based in one country will not
receive a competitive advantage by enjoying a lower capital adequacy
standard than a bank located in another country.' 9 These non-binding
guidelines have been incorporated into national banking regulations for
the Group of Ten Countries and a number of other countries as well. 20
One of the effects of the Basle Accord has been to focus on the credit
and market risks associated with the financial derivatives described
above, and to adopt rules establishing capital requirements for such
transactions, which under previous rules often escaped such require-
ments. The Basle Committee is continuing to wrestle with possible
amendments to the Basle Accord on Capital Adequacy to take into ac-
count the new risks associated with these markets, which are still not
well understood.2
D. Coordinated Supervision of Banking
While banking is an international industry, banking regulation is al-
most entirely national. This is true even though many banking activities
have effects in multiple jurisdictions. Nevertheless, until recently there
was no multilateral framework for coordinating international banking
supervision.
The coordination of supervision by national banking authorities dates
from the mid-1970's, when the Basle Committee (then known as the
"Cooke Committee") adopted common principles for the supervision of
banks' foreign establishments through a set of broad guidelines known as
the Basle Concordat. Revised in 1983 and supplemented in 1990,1 the
Basle Concordat provides guidance to authorities to avoid conflicts of
regulatory supervision. As with the Basle Accord on Capital Adequacy,
the Concordat itself is non-binding.
Even with the Basle Concordat, supervision of international banking is
a rudimentary science. This became evident in 1991, in the aftermath of
the Bank of England's declaration of insolvency of the Bank of Credit
and Commerce International ("BCCI"), a global banking institution that
was accused of illegal banking operations in many parts of the world.
Despite the Basle Concordat, BCCI was able to escape prudential super-
vision by falling between the cracks of national regulation.
19. On the Basle Accord generally, see Michael Malloy, The Corporate Law of Banks
140-53 (Cum. Supp. No. 1, 1989)
20. A similar effort is under way, under the auspices of the International Organiza-
tion of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"), to adopt capital adequacy standards for se-
curities firms. See Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, International Standards for Consolidated
Supervision of Financial Conglomerates" Controlling Systemic Risk, 19 Brook. J. Int'l L.
137 (1993); International Capital Markets. Part I, supra note 8, at 33-36.
21. See International Capital Markets. Part II, supra note 9, at 31-32.
22. See International Capital Markets. Part II, supra note 9, at 37.
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The effects of the BCCI case are still being felt, both in national law23
and in international coordination. The BCCI case proves that banking
regulators in different countries in which a bank is operating should not
assume that some other regulator was responsible for the overall health
and solvency of a bank. In BCCI's case, Luxembourg, the location of
BCCI's bank holding company, did not exercise significant regulatory
authority because BCCI's operations were largely offshore.24
In reaction to the BCCI case, the Basle Committee has reformulated
the Basle Concordat to strengthen the notion of "consolidated supervi-
sion." Under this concept, banking authorities should ensure that inter-
national banking groups are supervised on a global basis by a home-
country authority capable of providing responsible supervision of the
groups global operations. Host-country and home-country supervisors
would both approve any cross-border establishments, and home-country
supervisors would have access to information on cross-border
establishments.25
Adjustments to the Basle Concordat notwithstanding, international
banking continues to be characterized by an essential fact: banking is
international, while regulation is national. These early attempts at coor-
dination through the Basle Committee do not negate the fact that, even
in their international activities, banks are subject to systems of regulation
that vary from country to country, and sharing of information between
national banking regulators has been the exception rather than the rule.
E. International Money Laundering
If financial derivatives are the growth industry of international bank-
ing, money laundering is the growth industry of banking regulation.
Since the early 1980's, when the United States Treasury and Justice De-
partments began to attack organized crime's use of the financial system,
there has been a proliferation of legislation in the United States as well as
abroad, aimed at monitoring domestic and international payments.26 In
addition, many countries, following the lead of the United States, have
adopted money laundering legislation that criminalizes activity that was
formerly (and in many countries still is) seen as normal banking behav-
ior: helping persons move money from country to country to escape de-
23. In the United States, the BCCI scandal engendered the Foreign Bank Supervision
Enhancement Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-242, §§ 201-74, 105 Stat. 2236, 2286-2343 (1991)
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
24. See Brian R. Allen, Comment, The Banking Confidentiality Laws of Luxembourg
and Bank of Credit & Commerce International. The Best Kept Secret in Europe, 28 Tex.
Int'l L.J. 73, 82-92 (1993).
25. See International Capital Markets. Part II, supra note 9, at 37.
26. See generally Charles A. Intriago, International Money Laundering (1991) (com-
paring money laundering legislation in seven countries, including the United States and
the United Kingdom); Sarah J. Hughes, Policing Money Laundering Through Funds
Transfers: A Critique of Regulation Under the Bank Secrecy Act, 67 Ind. L.J. 283 (1992).
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tection by government authorities, without asking any questions of their
customers.
At first, bankers reacted to these legislative and enforcement activities
by summoning the principle of banking secrecy to absolve them of con-
cerns over the use of the international banking system by criminals. This
attitude has changed, however, in part out of compulsion. Bank regula-
tors now expect banks to observe currency reporting and other laws that
require the monitoring of payments, and to report to authorities informa-
tion that they receive on suspicious activities. We are beginning to see
increased international cooperation in this area, primarily on a bilateral
basis through the conclusion of mutual legal assistance treaties between
the United States and other countries.
There remains, nonetheless, a sense of uneasiness about the extent of
banks' responsibilities to "know their customer" and to certify the un-
derlying legality of their operations. Many bankers are pessimistic about
the ability of government regulations to sanitize the banking system, es-
pecially when, it is assumed, illegal funds can always be shunted to an
offshore banking haven that has more relaxed standards of behavior.
F. Trade in Banking Services
Although not a primary concern of banking regulators, issues regard-
ing the establishment of a General Agreement on Trade in Services
("G.A.T.S.") that would liberalize trade in financial services are of great
concern to bankers themselves. The Uruguay Round of GATT negotia-
tions has concluded such an agreement, although it lacks a binding set of
rules that would liberalize-to the extent desired by the United States
and other banking powers-restrictions on cross-border trade in financial
services or on the right of establishment.27 Nevertheless, the G.A.T.S.
offers some hope for the conclusion of an eventual trade regime that
would cover banking services.
G. The IMF's Non-Role in Bank Regulation
All of the regulatory concerns that I have mentioned have one thing in
common: the lack of any mention of a role to be played by the IMF in
dealing with them. This is true even in cases where the IMF is intensely
interested in the phenomenon. For instance, the IMF has contributed
intelligent staff reports on developments in international capital markets,
and has called attention to the importance of these developments for the
international monetary system.28 Nowhere mentioned in the reports is
any role-even an indirect one-that the IMF might play in regards to
these issues of banking regulation.
IMF-watchers will quickly add an obvious point: the IMF deals with
27. On the negotiation of financial services in the Uruguay Round, see generally
Footer, supra note 4.
28. See supra notes 7-9, 33.
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international monetary relations, not with private international banking
per se. The IMF monitors central banks, not private banks. It has no
role to play vis-a-vis the latter.
I would argue otherwise. If we look at the legitimate concerns of the
IMF-as I shall do in the following section-we shall see that the IMF
will be largely ineffective in achieving its goals unless it becomes more
actively engaged in helping governments to establish individual and col-
lective rules for optimum international banking regulation. In particular,
as I will argue below, the members of the IMF should agree to accept a
greater role for the Fund in providing a backdrop of rules to deal with
disturbances in international capital markets and in the international
payments system.
II. CONCERNS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
The IMF's chief role in the world is to promote exchange rate stability
and to assist members in achieving equilibrium in their balance of pay-
ments. Another principal goal, contained in IMF Article I, is to promote
a liberal system of international payments.
If one were giving out report cards, what grade would you give the
IMF for having helped achieve these goals? Are exchange rates stable?
Do countries suffer balance of payments disequilibria? Is the interna-
tional payments system adequate to the needs of the world economy?
We should find an answer to these questions by looking at the current
concerns of the international monetary system-concerns that are linked
one to another. Equally important, they arise out of the same conditions
that create challenges for banking regulation.
A. Exchange Rate Instability
Exchange rate volatility, rather than exchange rate stability, has be-
come a fact of life in the world economy. To take just one recent exam-
ple, in 1992, the United States dollar appreciated against major
currencies by 7% through early March, depreciated by 10% through
early September, and then appreciated again by 14% by the end of the
year. By the end of 1992, the dollar had gained 25% against the British
pound and the Italian lira. In one brief week of trading during February
1994, the United States dollar depreciated against the Japanese yen by
10% (5% on one day alone), and the devaluation became a factor in the
trade war between the two countries. Within Europe, there was sufficient
pressure against some currencies to cause the temporary breakup of the
European Communities' exchange rate mechanism, which holds Euro-
pean currencies within a stable band.
It is hard for even the most positive IMF-watcher to argue that the
IMF's goal to insure exchange rate stability has been met. There are
several troublesome aspects to this conclusion. First, a worrisome level
of exchange rate volatility has marked the international monetary system
1962 [Vol. 62
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even though underlying economic conditions have been relatively stable.
There is no worldwide recession, as in the 1930's, nor are the
macroeconomic conditions of the major industrial countries that dissimi-
lar. There may be a somewhat higher level of unemployment in Europe
than in the United States, or slightly higher indices of inflation in one
country or another, but the underlying economies are not as unstable as
exchange rate movements might lead us to believe. This might give us
some pause-how much more pronounced might exchange rate move-
ments be if certain major countries did suffer from extreme recession or
other economic (or even political) disruptions.
Second, exchange rate instability carries a cost for every society con-
nected with the international system. A rapid depreciation of one cur-
rency against another can turn a profitable contract for the provision of
goods or services into a major loss for one of the parties, despite the most
careful calculations of the contracting parties. Exchange rate instability
injects a major additional risk into the costs of engaging in international
business.
Fortunately, we are told, the financial industry has invented a wide
array of financial products that allow companies and even individuals to
hedge their exchange rate risks. Many of these products are the same
financial derivatives--currency options, swaps, etc.--discussed earlier.
This "answer" does not negate the societal costs of instability, however,
for the products themselves carry a cost or premium. Indeed, one might
even view that sector of the financial industry that is devoted to the sell-
ing and trading of hedging instruments-all those highly paid bankers,
all those computers and electronic trading links, all those profits earned
by banks on foreign exchange trading-as the cost that the rest of society
pays for the comfort of knowing that we will not wake up tomorrow
morning to read in the newspaper that our future economic plans have
been ruined because the dollar has sunk on world exchange markets. In
a more perfect world-the simple world of the old fixed exchange rate
system?-we didn't need a closet full of expensive financial products to
assure ourselves of a peaceful night's sleep. A large segment of the per-
sonnel and equipment used for exchange trading could be put to work
producing something in the real economy, like organizing vacation trips
to Cancfin.
Why have exchange rates been so much more unstable than the under-
lying economic conditions in different countries? The answer is as simple
as it is disturbing: the same financial markets that allow us to hedge our
exchange risks create the instability that requires their use. If these mar-
kets responded only to reasonable expectations of underlying economic
conditions, they would not generate such pronounced movements in the
values of currencies, because underlying economic conditions do not
change so rapidly or to such an extent as exchange rates.
Paul Krugman, a professor of economics at MIT, has pointed out the
costs to world economies due to exchange rate instability:
1994] 1963
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[e]xchange-rate instability has resulted not only from reasonable mar-
ket responses to changes in policies and underlying conditions but also
from failures in the international financial markets. In particular, the
traditional fear that floating exchange rates will be subject to destabi-
lizing speculation-to speculative bubbles that do real harm-is, un-
fortunately, strongly supported by the evidence of the 1980's.29
Professor Krugman questions whether foreign exchange markets operate
efficiently and rationally. "[T]he foreign-exchange market seems to make
two kinds of errors, . . . [i]t fails to recognize short-run trends, so that
forecast errors are serially correlated, and it loses sight of long-run equi-
librium, so that it runs away in temporary speculative bubbles."3
Under these conditions, what is the role of the IMF? How is the insti-
tution to achieve the goal of promoting exchange stability? The nominal
role of the IMF at present is one of "surveillance" of exchange arrange-
ments, in accordance with IMF Article IV, section 3. "Surveillance" is
one of many euphemisms that exist in IMF parlance that make it seem as
if there is substance to something that is in fact insubstantial. The
Fund's role at present consists of trying to understand how government
policies affect exchange rates, and making suggestions to the Group of 7
countries to adopt coordinated policies to try to mitigate fluctuations. 3'
There is little discipline or enforcement involved in this process.
Dissatisfaction with the results of this policy has given rise to many
proposals for reform of the exchange rate system-by the adoption of
target zones, pegged rates, closer macroeconomic coordination, etc.-but
few concrete proposals have surfaced that grant a significant role to the
IMF. A recent study by members of the IMF staff, who might be ex-
pected to promote a greater role for their organization, took a pessimistic
view of a more pronounced role for the IMF in administering an ex-
change rate regime with some kind of teeth. While acknowledging that
some observers had recommended explicit rules, "[a]mong practitioners,
however, the idea of moving away from informal processes to a set of
formal rules appears to have little support .... But the lack of support
for formal rules does not diminish the importance of quantitative
indicators."32
Lawyers may be overly enamored of rules, since they allow us to dis-
play our rhetorical and analytical skills. Even discounting this bias, how-
ever, it is hard to get excited about a "regime" that is founded on
something as uninspiring as "quantitative indicators."
29. See Paul R. Krugman, Exchange-Rate Instability 77 (1989).
30. Id. at 95.
31. See International Monetary Fund, Policy Issues in the Evolving International
Monetary System 28-31 (Morris Goldstein et al., Occasional Paper No. 96, 1992) (dis-
cussing the role of the IMF in promoting global economic stability by strengthening mul-
tilateral surveillance and policy coordination).
32. Id. at 30-31.
1964 [Vol. 62
GLOBAL BANKING NETWORK
B. Short-Term Capital Movements
Closely tied to issues of exchange rate instability is the growth in
short-term capital movements around the world. Simply put, the latter
beget the former. In a series of recent studies,33 the IMF has focused
attention on the growth in international capital movements. Most of the
growth in net and gross capital flows has occurred between major indus-
trialized countries. As the IMF has noted, these flows occur in a system
of increasingly integrated capital markets:
[T]he integration of global financial markets has proceeded much more
rapidly than that of goods markets-in part because the latter has been
inhibited by protectionism.... [T]his growing integration of financial
markets has important implications for the effectiveness of
macroeconomic policies and systemic risks.34
The concern over capital flows relates directly to the concern over ex-
change rates. Liberal economics teaches that capital as a factor of pro-
duction should move to where it can be used most productively, thus
benefitting both savers and borrowers. This may be particularly true of
long-term capital movements, such as foreign direct investment. Short-
term capital flows, which characterize a large part of capital markets to-
day, are another matter. As Paul Krugman has argued, such capital
flows do not respond just to interest-rate differentials (i.e., to rates of
return on capital, which should be a relative measure of productivity of
capital), but also to speculative bubbles that may be contrary to efficient
allocation of world capital.3" "The end result of the expectational failure
of the foreign-exchange markets has been a huge, largely unrecognized
misallocation of investment resources. ' 3 6
Of course, industrialized countries are not the only ones adversely af-
fected by the growth of capital flows due to the integration of world capi-
tal markets. Developing countries have also suffered the consequences of
such flows, in particular by the phenomenon of large capital outflows, or
capital flight.37 Many observers have noted, for instance, that the Third
World debt crisis of the 1980's would never have occurred-or at least
would not have been so protracted-if the debtor countries had not ex-
perienced such pronounced levels of capital flight. According to IMF
figures, capital flight as a percentage of total external indebtedness of the
most highly indebted developing countries varied from 42% in 1978 to
33. See, eg., Determinants and Systemic Consequences of International Capital
Flows, supra note 7, at 4-19 (studying trends in international capital flows among indus-
trial and developing countries during the 1970's and 1980's).
34. Id. at 7.
35. See Krugman, supra note 29, at 86-94.
36. Id. at 94.
37. It is interesting to note that, in the case of developing countries, it is more com-
mon to see the use of the pejorative term "capital flight," whereas industrialized countries
undergo "large outflows." Rarely does one see a discussion of "capital flight" associated
with the United States, for instance, even in the face of large, sustained movements
against the dollar.
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51% in 1988.38 In other words, remove capital flight and you remove the
debt crisis.
Capital flight may carry a negative connotation, but most people still
believe that capital movements--even short-term capital movements-
are good. For one thing, they represent the "discipline of the market" in
an international monetary system that no longer faces the discipline of a
fixed-rate regime. Capital movements may be seen as votes in favor of or
against particular economies, rewarding "good economic behavior" and
penalizing bad performance.
The discipline of the capital markets may, however, be like the disci-
pline administered to a youngster by a cranky old uncle: it may be overly
harsh, arbitrary and irrational.
The relationship between capital movements and exchange rate insta-
bility is clearly established. What is the IMF's role in assisting members
to deal with the consequences of capital movements? Again, the IMF's
role is largely a non-role. In establishing a code of conduct for interna-
tional payments, the IMF Articles of Agreement were drafted to pro-
mote free movement of funds for the payment of current international
transactions-i.e., for payment of goods and services. Few people ques-
tion the importance of the IMF's rules in this regard. When it comes to
capital movements, however, the IMF's stance is more schizophrenic:
the IMF's Articles permit governments to control capital movements so
long as such controls do not interfere with freedom of payments for cur-
rent transactions.39 Despite this broad permission of capital controls, the
IMF appears to endorse policies of member governments that include as
a goal the liberalization, if not elimination, of capital controls.4" Since
the IMF has very little authority to direct the implementation of such a
goal, it has largely remained on the sideline while other players-espe-
cially private players, such as banks and investors-determine the out-
come of the capital movements game.
The lack of definite rules concerning short-term capital movements is
not surprising when one considers the genesis of the IMF. When the
IMF Agreement was adopted, short-term capital movements played a
less important role in the international economy than they do now. The
IMF could concentrate its efforts on eliminating restrictions on current
transactions, since these were the transactions that monopolized the for-
eign exchanges. This is no longer the case, and transactions in the capital
account of the balance of payments now have more to do with balance of
payments equilibrium and exchange rate movements than do current
38. See Determinants and Systemic Consequences, supra note 7, at 84, tbl. 1.
39. See IMF Article VI, § 3; Article VIII, § 2(a). The IMF rules on exchange con-
trois and payments restrictions are well summarized in Richard W. Edwards, Jr., Inter-
national Monetary Collaboration 380-490 (1985).
40. See the views expressed in International Monetary Fund, Liberalization of the
Capital Account: Experiences and Issues (Donald J. Mathieson & Liliana Rojas-Sufirez,
Occasional Paper No. 103, 1993).
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transactions for payments of goods and services. It is harder today to
justify the IMF's equivocal nature concerning capital movements.
C. Integrity of the International Payments System
As stated at the outset, one of the IMF's goals is to promote a secure
system of multilateral payments for current transactions. The IMF has
made a concerted effort to convince governments to remove exchange
control restrictions that inhibit the payments system. Even so, many
governments do still impose exchange controls on current transactions,
as evidenced in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions, which lists the restrictions of individual
members.
Other aspects of the security of the international payments system
have escaped the IMF's concern. Even as many governments have re-
laxed exchange controls that hamper international payments, other gov-
ernments have initiated new controls. This latest wave of controls comes
from an effort, begun by the United States government, to try to attack
illegal activities-organized crime and drug trafficking in particular-by
detecting the use of the international payments system for transferring
funds that are the product of illegal activities. In the United States,
money laundering legislation 4 and currency transactions reporting
laws42 place great emphasis on the monitoring of payments-i.e., on ex-
change controls. (Keep in mind that exchange controls include regula-
tions aimed merely at monitoring rather than preventing payments).
Other countries have since established their own money laundering laws,
and we are beginning to see intergovernmental efforts to promote regula-
tion of the payments network for these purposes.43 Despite the relevance
of these activities to the functioning of the international payments sys-
tem, the IMF has little to do with this phenomenon.
Finally, as mentioned previously, bankers and bank regulators con-
tinue to be concerned about the possibility of systemic risks in the inter-
national payments system due to the possible consequences of default by
an account party in a payments transaction within one of the world's
payments clearing systems. Here also, the IMF has not been drawn into
the discussion of possible rules that might be generated to mitigate such
risks.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWMEEN BANKING REGULATION AND
IMF GOALS
If we compare the issues of international banking regulation, discussed
41. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (1988).
42. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-24 (1988).
43. See New Frontiers in the Regulation of International Money Movement in the
Wake of BCCI, American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the Annual Meet-
ing, 188-209 (1992).
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in Part I, with the principal concerns of international monetary relations
discussed in Part II, it is not difficult to see that the two are closely con-
nected. International banking activities, as beneficial to the world eco-
nomic growth as they may have been, have also helped create problems
in the international monetary system. Activities in banking and capital
markets have helped generate the instabilities and disruptions associated
with exchange rates and balance of payments equilibrium. The phenom-
enal growth of foreign exchange trading and short-term capital move-
ments have brought periods of severe exchange rate instability. The
extension of trade in financial services through networks that reach into
all corners of the world challenge the efforts of domestic monetary au-
thorities to control money supplies and to regulate domestic capital mar-
kets. The creation of a low-cost international payments and deposit
system promotes international business, but it also makes it easier for
companies and individuals to evade taxes and avoid fiscal and monetary
controls established by national authorities.
It is true that some of these disruptions and instabilities may emanate
from underlying economic and political conditions, rather than banking
operations per se. The global banking network is merely the circuit in
which market forces operate; it is the latter that should attract attention,
through responsible monetary policies. The need for responsible fiscal
and monetary policy is not a reason not to regulate the circuit, however.
To use an analogy, traffic accidents are caused by bad drivers, not by
superhighways; nevertheless, that is not a reason to refrain from regulat-
ing the construction of highways, or the activities of those that use them.
The ingenuity of bankers in creating and exploiting new financial prod-
ucts and new markets even before they are well understood contributes
to the degree of uncertainty that characterizes the international monetary
system. As the creators of a financial superhighway, bankers should ex-
pect that governments, individually and collectively, will want to regu-
late international traffic on that highway. Since their activities
profoundly affect the health of the international monetary system, bank-
ers might even concede that the IMF might have something to say about
what they are doing.
My central argument is this: If it is true that banks are part of the
problem, then the IMF cannot continue to ignore the regulation of pri-
vate banking activities if it is to play a role in alleviating disruptions in
the international monetary system. My thesis is really twofold: first,
IMF member countries should accept a greater role for the IMF in creat-
ing the necessary conditions for exchange rate stability and the smooth
functioning of international capital markets and payments mechanisms.
Second, the IMF will only be able to accomplish these goals if it becomes
more actively involved in the regulation of the global banking network.
The IMF should provide a forum through which national banking au-
thorities, working with its staff, can arrive at optimal systems for the
regulation of international banking, international capital markets, and in-
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ternational payments mechanisms that insure greater stability of the in-
ternational monetary system as a whole.
Until now, the IMF has largely remained on the sideline while interna-
tional banks have helped to generate monetary chaos. When the situa-
tion becomes intolerable, the IMF is then called in to help bail out the
countries that are on the verge of financial ruin. The Third World debt
crisis of the 1980's was a good example of this. By the early 1980's, as
syndicated eurodolar lending expanded, many bankers viewed the IMF
as a largely irrelevant institution. After all, the IMF no longer adminis-
tered a fixed exchange rate system, and its function of providing financial
assistance to countries was increasingly displaced by the brave new
Eurodollar market. We all know what happened: the Eurodollar loans
generated a debt crisis, and by 1983 the banks were all too willing to
engage the IMF and World Bank in helping them to deal with the mess
through IMF-endorsed adjustment measures.
We should question the wisdom of the IMF's non-role in the debt-
crisis prior to 1982, just as we should question today the non-role of the
Fund in dealing with disruptive capital markets. To use an analogy, if
the IMF is going to be asked to help put out fires, shouldn't it take a
greater role in fire prevention?
It is not as if the IMF does not recognize the dangers inherent in a
monetary system at the mercy of deregulated banking and capital mar-
kets. IMF studies have pointed to a pattern of financial crises preceded
by the introduction of new financial instruments or new market condi-
tions that are not well understood--in short, by the conditions that
now prevail, as shown in Part I of this Article. Yet no one seems to be
suggesting that the IMF take a more active role in regulating these mar-
kets for the benefit of the monetary system as a whole.
The easy response to my suggestion might be that "this is someone
else's job." The IMF is supposed to handle relations between central
bankers, not private bankers.
Unfortunately, no other organization has asserted a satisfactory role to
control the negative effects produced by international capital markets.
The Bank for International Settlements, under whose auspices the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision operates, has served as the principal
forum to date for the coordination of bank regulatory policies.45 Yet the
Basle Committee has done very little to date to subject international capi-
44. See Determinants and Systemic Consequences, supra note 7, at 30-37.
45. In a recent report, the United States General Accounting Office recognized the
need to strengthen international banking supervision, and recommended enhancing the
role of the BIS as the principal forum for this purpose. See United States, General Ac-
counting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, International Banking: Strength-
ening the Framework for Supervising International Banks (GAO/GGD-94-68, March
1994) 3-4, 45-47. The GAO report found little support for a strong supranational au-
thority. See iai at 3, 46. However, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which
supervises national banks in the United States, questioned both the appropriateness of the
BIS as forum, and the lack of support for supranational authority. See id at 49, 73.
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tal markets and international banks to measures of control that would
guard against disruptive effects of short-term capital movements.
Furthermore, the BIS is an exclusive club representing the central
banks of the most highly industrialized (Group of Ten) countries. While
the Basle Committee includes the home country regulators of the world's
largest banks, it does not represent the views of all countries that would
be affected by more rigorous regulation of international capital markets.
The OECD-another organization that has over the years dealt with is-
sues of capital movements-is a similarly exclusive organization,
although its membership is expanding somewhat.
By contrast, the IMF has become-after the inclusion of the republics
of the former Soviet Union-a virtually universal organization, with a
membership of 180 countries. As such, it can hope to insure a universal
observance of any rules that might be adopted. While the IMF is a uni-
versal organization, its decision-making structure-based on a weighted
voting system-protects the countries with the greatest share of interna-
tional banking activity by allocating decision-making power according to
relative economic power.
As mentioned previously, the IMF has focused its concern on the need
for coordination of international capital markets. A 1991 report by IMF
economists stated: "[t]he responsibility to calm financial markets in peri-
ods of turbulence may be especially important today, as a result of in-
creased integration of global financial markets."46 Nevertheless, the
report cautioned against throwing "'sand in the wheels' of the interna-
tional capital markets by accepting restrictions ... on capital flows.""
While refraining from suggesting a role for the IMF to play in the pro-
cess, the report focused on the need for "If]oint undertakings by the pub-
lic and private sectors... along with a coordinated approach by central
banks and other regulatory bodies.""a However, the report fell short of
recommending that the IMF play a definite role in this endeavor.
The IMF's reluctance as an institution to assume an active role is not
surprising. As stated earlier, the IMF is a reactive organization rather
than a proactive one. The international civil servants in the IMF do not
tend to define new roles or activities for the organization, but rather re-
spond to pressures from outside forces, primarily from the IMF's largest
members.
What specific functions should the IMF undertake? Let me mention
several, keeping in mind that each of these deserves much more detailed
treatment than I can give here.
First, the IMF should organize itself as a forum in which the regula-
tion of international capital markets becomes a subject of discussion by
governmental and intergovernmental agencies. Because the regulation of
46. International Monetary Fund, Characteristics of a Successful Exchange Rate Sys-
tem 15 (Jacob A. Frenkel et al., Occasional Paper No. 82, 1991).
47. Id. at 16.
48. Id. at 17.
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international banking is closely related to its primary goals, the IMF is
the most appropriate intergovernmental organization to provide such a
forum. In other words, it is in the IMF's strong interest to take a strong
hand in this endeavor.
To begin with, the forum could be as informal as the Basle Committee
on Banking Supervision. It need not include all IMF members in all
discussions, but since the IMF enjoys a global membership, it can afford
representation to members from outside the BIS fraternity of industrial-
ized nations. Such representation is important, since a greater degree of
capital market regulation could be defeated by banks escaping to non-
regulated offshore banking centers.49 By making participation in a regu-
latory scheme part of the price of continued enjoyment of IMF member-
ship, worldwide compliance with agreed regulations would be more
easily assured. Eventually, the formation of an organization affiliated
with the IMF may be needed, in order to specialize in the issues dis-
cussed here-the confluence of international banking regulation and in-
ternational monetary issues.
Second, the IMF should exercise some authority in pressing, within
such a forum, for a regime of regulated international capital markets. A
great deal of study is now underway, in universities, governments and
organizations like the IMF, on the optimal degree of capital market regu-
lation. My own bias in this regard should be clear to you by now: free
and deregulated markets may be positive goals for the allocation of non-
banking goods and services, but financial markets--especially the bank-
ing market, to which we entrust public savings-should be highly regu-
lated, within parameters that allow the interplay of market forces
without inflicting on society the abuses that can accompany normal
human urge towards unsettling speculation: speculative bubbles, market
crashes, and the evasion of fiscal and monetary laws.
One possible role for an IMF-sponsored system of regulation would be
to create a sort of international "FDA." In the United States, the Food
and Drug Administration must give its approval to new drug products
before they are put on the market, and may order the removal of prod-
ucts that are deemed harmful to health. Products that lack FDA ap-
proval simply cannot be sold. A similar process could be used to create a
system of tested international financial products that meet societies'
needs for investments and hedging, but which do lend themselves to the
harmful side effects of instability and speculative bubbles.
Third, the IMF should work to convince the world banking commu-
nity and its member governments to accept a compromise that, in my
opinion, will eventually be generally accepted by the world banking com-
munity. The compromise is this: there must be a trade-off between free-
49. Cf International Monetary Fund, Characteristics of a Successful Exchange Rate
System, supra note 9, at 16 ("Yet there is always an incentive for some country to capture
more of the world's business by not imposing the tax [of increased regulation].").
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dom of international capital movements and banking secrecy. The price
to pay for being able to shift money around the world in a low-cost and
secure international payments system is a willingness to allow govern-
ments to track international payments and to pry into the beneficial own-
ership of bank deposits. The possibilities under conditions of space-age
banking for abuse of strict banking secrecy laws are too high to permit
the continuation of a principle adopted before the creation of a global
banking network. It should be possible to find legitimate standards for
governmental intrusion while also developing standards to ensure a
proper level of financial privacy.
Such a tradeoff is already occurring, as shown above,5" by increased
intergovernmental cooperation over laws designed to deter money laun-
dering and prevent the use of the international payments system by drug
traffickers. The IMF's Articles of Agreement, in one of the least cited
provisions of the entire IMF charter, provide explicitly for such
cooperation.5 1
Here again, the inclusiveness of IMF membership is important to the
creation of a system of regulation that cannot be easily avoided by the
use of unregulated offshore banking centers. Compliance with IMF-
sponsored regulations on monitoring would be the price to pay for access
to the international payments and clearing network that is a necessary
condition for the efficiency of modern banking operations.
With the advent of global banking, we are witnessing the gradual crea-
tion of a network of depository institutions linked by sophisticated tele-
communications and computer systems. Until now, it has been assumed
that the creation of such a network makes government regulation impos-
sible, as if the ease of capital movements to all corners of the world
dooms the possibility of control. I suspect, however, that we are merely
witnessing an intermediate stage in the creation of global banking. At
some point in the not-too-distant future, global banking will be carried
out by well-supervised banking institutions that will be required to par-
ticipate in a single network of international payments and deposits-a
closed system to which all reputable banks would have to belong.
There is no reason why the linkages provided by S.W.I.F.T., CHIPS
and other electronic payments mechanisms in the international system
could not be arranged into a single, closed network to which all banking
participants and their governments would have to adhere. Such a net-
work could help ensure security, but would also significantly enhance the
effectiveness of government regulation, through the tracing of payments
and deposits. Increasingly, the use of physical currency-banknotes,
traveller's checks, etc.-is an inadequate substitute in legitimate business
50. See text accompanying supra note 43.
51. See IMF Article VIII, § VIII (2)(b) ("In addition, members may, by mutual
accord, cooperate in measures for the purpose of making the exchange control regula-
tions of either member more effective, provided that such measures and regulations arc
consistent with this Agreement.").
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transactions for electronic transfers of funds. International capital move-
ments will increasingly occur over the international payments network,
subject to increased monitoring.
If such a system were endorsed by the IMF, it would not be difficult to
isolate "haven" countries that would otherwise be used to defeat the
more regulated payments network of the official, "closed system." Gov-
ernments that refused to participate would suffer the effect of being ex-
cluded from the benefits of using IMF facilities.
The dangers of abuse of governmental authority over such a payments
mechanism would not be insurmountable. Experts are already beginning
to address the issue of international standards for regulating financial pri-
vacy,52 and just as the world trading community administers rules that
penalize countries for unfair trading practices, the IMF-sponsored pay-
ments network could similarly administer rules to prevent the abuses for
which banking secrecy was initially invented.
In short, freedom of capital movement benefits the world economy.
But a system of unregulated capital markets, in which funds can be trans-
ferred under the veil of bank secrecy, has the potential to undermine the
governmental authority necessary to ensure sound economies, in individ-
ual nations as well as in the world as a whole. In the international mone-
tary system that now exists, the IMF is still the best hope to inject an
element of discipline into international banking and capital markets in
order to achieve stability in the world economy.
52. See, eg., Joel R. Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course: Hurdling Barriers to
Transnational Financial Services, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 137 (1992) (examining the chal-
lenges to transnational financial services resulting from national regulation of information
processing and arguing for a convergence on standards of fair information practice
through legal, technological and societal techniques for specific contexts).
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